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1. Lawrence Freedman
I’m new to Lawrence Friedman, a professor of war studies at King’s College in London, but this newsletter on Putin’s war is titled “A Reckless Gamble” and it’s pretty interesting analysis:
One of the main reasons that wars can turn badly, even if they are started with confidence, is undermining the enemy. The type of optimism bias that leads to the prediction of an early victory depends on the perceptions of a decadent and brainless opponent, ready to surrender at the first wave of danger. , , ,
As well as underestimating the forces of the enemy, you can also underestimate yourself. Overall, Putin has done well in his wars. He received the presidency in 2000, using the Second Chechen War to demonstrate his leadership qualities. He bled Georgia in 2008 to warn of joining NATO and destroying the separatist enclaves already established by Russia. He annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and most recently successfully supported Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian civil war. Yet not enough ground forces have been deployed in their most recent military ventures. In Ukraine, operations, including the annexation of Crimea, were largely carried out by special forces, with fighters recruited by separatists in the Donbass. Only briefly, when the separatists saw that they might be defeated in the summer of 2014, Putin sent regular forces, which defeated unprepared and still amateur Ukrainian units. In Syria, the Russians provided air power but not infantry. , , ,
The most striking example of this from yesterday was the battle for Hostomel, an air base near Kiev, which the Russians tried to take over with Heliborne troops. If this airport had been taken quickly, the Russians could fly in troops who could then quickly move to Kiev. But it was a gamble because without backup they were in an exposed position. Ukrainians shot down several helicopters and then crushed Russian forces in a fierce battle. It is telling that after months of planning for this entire operation, in which every step is meticulously written, that the planners decided to try something high-risk on day one.
Read the whole thing.
One aspect of the conflict that Friedman discusses is the importance of the Ukrainian resistance. Because the stronger their fighting spirit, the harder it is for the West to leave them:
We now know that Ukrainians are serious and resilient when it comes to defending their country. They have not been rolled over. A quick take would have helped Putin a lot. For example, the design and implementation of Western sanctions would have felt very different if it had been explicitly taking place on Ukraine against the backdrop of Russia. This would have rendered opponents very punitive with the argument that what happened to Ukraine was a tragedy, a situation about which very little could be done, and that such costly gestures were in vain.
Friedman also talks about the fate of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. On Friday night (local time) Zelensky appeared in a video from Kiev, insisting that he planned to stay and fight.
He declined the offer of evacuation from the United States. Ukraine’s military captured Kiev early Saturday morning, and Zelensky, walking with his countrymen, took to the streets of the capital. This is a level of personal bravery that we are not completely used to seeing from heads of state. Zelensky’s conduct over the past few weeks – which has been utterly extraordinary – has largely reinforced Ukraine’s resolve. He has become more than a man. more than a leader. He has become a symbol.
What we are witnessing is the rise of a figure who will become an important part of Ukraine’s history for the next century. His statue will be installed all over the country. Ukrainians will name their children after him. It’s like watching another country’s Washington or Churchill emerge in real time.
I hope we all appreciate how special it is. And how rare. Because usually when world-historical figures come out, it’s because they’re the bad guys.
But at some point he may have to make a decision about how his life best serves his country. Is it more important that he lives to lead? Even if he eventually has to leave Kiev? Or will sacrificing himself for the Russians make this symbol even more powerful?
It’s disgusting to talk about a man like that because it’s important to remember that Volodymyr is not Zelensky Just now a symbol. He is a real person. He is 44 years old. She is married. They have two children, one of whom is not yet 10 years old.
But this is where history has its eye on him. It is a tremendous privilege, but also an unimaginable burden.
God protect this man and the people of Ukraine.
2. Full Stack Economics
“Ban” is a much more complicated topic than it appears. People tend to think of pushing sanctions as a button that automatically hurts the bad guy.
This is not the correct frame.
Instead, think of restrictions like using chemotherapy to treat cancer. Chemo damages malignant cells; But it also damages healthy cells. The goal of chemo treatment is to kill the cancer before it kills the chemo patient. And sometimes the cancer responds to chemo. But sometimes it doesn’t happen.
It’s an abstract analogy, but you get the idea. In Full Stack Economics, Alan Cole has a more technical explanation:
In general, voluntary trading is good for both sides of the transaction because they each receive something that is more valuable than what they have given. This is known as consumer surplus, if you are buying something you like at a favorable price, or producer surplus, if you are selling something for a profit.
If you impose restrictions, you are sacrificing some of your own surplus to eliminate your target’s surplus. This isn’t necessarily a big deal, but it can be less expensive than military intervention.
The rest of Cole’s piece explains why the new round of NATO sanctions against Putin was not as aggressive as it could have been. Short version: It’s not because we were trying to go easy on Putin; That’s because we’re trying not to take more pain for ourselves than our political will:
The problem hurting Russia’s access to the international banking system is that the Russian economy uses that banking system in large part to export energy. And the White House has been very clear: it does not want to harm global energy markets.
Dalip Singh, deputy national security advisor and deputy director of the National Economic Council, said, “We have deliberately expanded the scope of our sanctions to have a severe impact on the Russian economy, while minimizing costs to the US as well as its allies and partners.” Is.” a Press conference Yesterday “To be clear, our sanctions are not designed to cause any disruption to the current flow of energy from Russia to the world.”
And here’s the catch: The Treasury needed to plug a major loophole in what would otherwise have been a very successful financial trap. , , ,
Western citizens have effectively placed impossible constraints on their governments. They want to respond to aggression, but they do not want military intervention, and they are unwilling to take the economic pain of a more effective sanctions regime. Working within those impossible constraints, I think the Treasury is operating as expected.
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Fwiw, I think Biden has calculated correctly.
No sanctions to depose Putin – not even the toughest of the hard-core. Sanctions cannot win the war.
But they may lose the war. Because for it to be even more possible to win, we need two things:
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NATO unity.
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public support.
These are absolutely necessary preconditions. If you’ve sacrificed on a ban package to keep these together, so be it. Because a more robust sanctions regime, that is to say, isolates the Germans and thwarts their resolve – or helps elect a president who believes Putin is a “genius” – would be fatal to NATO purposes.
If we can build more NATO consensus and unite the people in this cause, then by all means keep intensifying sanctions. But also understand that they are a tool in our kit and cannot solve the problem without the use of other mechanisms.
At some point, soon, we will have to put more troops on the front lines of NATO countries and maybe even expand NATO.
3. Noah Smith
I love Noah Smith, but he was thrown into a false sense of hope after the Macron-Putin summit. So the war hit him hard and his excerpt from what he calls the world’s “moment of clarity” should be a must read for those who thought war between great powers was obsolete:
The law of the jungle is back, and the strong will dominate the weak if they see fit.
This will have many ripple effects. First, it would dramatically increase the incentive for nuclear proliferation – remember that Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994 in exchange for (useless) guarantees of security from the Russian Federation. Countries whose territory is threatened by powerful neighbors—Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, etc.—are now thinking very hard about whether to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.
It would also push countries to great-power coalition blocs, as in the Cold War (when most of the so-called “non-aligned” countries actually chose sides). Countries in Asia – India, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and so on – may now be thinking of getting closer to the United States if China should decide to follow Putin’s example. And hopefully the alliance will become more militarized – NATO could set up permanent bases in Eastern European countries like Poland and Romania, lest Putin’s appetites continue to grow.
So the moment after WW2 – a kind of extended party for the world to recover from the great devastation of the modern age – is now over. Perhaps it was always destined to end when the generation that once lived through it has passed.
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